Introduction
Bundling is becoming an important characteristic of the telecommunications industry. An increasing number of households prefers to consume telecommunication services in bundles, rather than separately. In addition, telecommunications …rms increasingly base their marketing strategies on these products. The increasing importance of bundles might be the result of many di¤erent causes, such as: technological progress, changes in consumption habits, or shifts in the strategic environment. For a discussion of these potential motives see Vareda (2011, 2013) .
Other examples of industries where bundling is prevalent include: insurance, software, newspapers, music or air transportation. While the theoretical literature on bundling, reviewed in Section 2, has been extensively developed over the last decades, empirical work on bundles has only recently experienced important advances, e.g., Chu et al. (2011) , Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) , Gentzkow (2007) , . An important void in this literature is the lack of modeling of both: (i) the demand for product assortments by consumers, and (ii) the joint decisions of pricing and supply of products by …rms. In the article we …ll in this void.
We propose a di¤erentiated product equilibrium model that has three important characteristics, following . First, there is a set of basic services. Second, …rms sell products that may consist of these individual services, or may combine several of them in bundles. Third, consumers choose alternatives, i.e., choose assortments of products that may consist of a single product sold by a given …rm, or may combine several products, possibly sold by di¤erent …rms. our framework includes Berry et al. (1995) and Nevo (2001) as a particular case, and allows to control for having alternatives embodying di¤erent services. In addition, allowing for consumer heterogeneity in tastes enables the examination of the role of this feature on the incentives to bundle, namely as a means to replicate price discrimination.
For the supply side, we allow …rms to choose both: (i) prices, and (ii) which products to supply, individual services and bundles. Firms acknowledge that consumers acquire their products as part of a product assortment, by letting the share of each product equal the sum of purchase probabilities where that product is present. In addition, the decision to sell or not a single service or a bundle impacts not only …rms'pro…ts, but also the set of alternatives available to consumers. Our supply model allows …rms to engage in various forms of pricing such as: component pricing, pure bundling, mixed bundling and tying.
We estimate the model using consumer-level data and survey data from the Portuguese telecommunications industry, focusing on triple-play bundles, i.e., products that include: (i) …xed telephony, (ii) …xed broadband access to the internet and (iii) subscription television. Since triple-play products embody three services and that one observes these services being supplied in di¤erent combinations across …rms and markets, this is a unique opportunity to study …rms' incentives to bundle. More speci…cally, we exploit the fact that in the context of triple-play products, sometimes …rms sell services in bundles that are unavailable individually, to identify …rm incentives to bundle products.
We use the estimated model to evaluate some of the incentives to bundle and tie identi…ed in the literature. While our model allows simulating the welfare impact of many policy issues of practical interest, e.g., mergers or tying bans, we focus on three issues: (i) cost synergies, (ii) consumer heterogeneity and (iii) market structure.
First, we examine if bundling is motivated by cost savings. The theoretical literature has argued that bundling is a consequence of the cost synergies associated to selling several products jointly. 4 We use the model's estimates to identify product marginal costs and test for bundling cost synergies. Our results do not reject the hypothesis there are no bundling cost synergies in this industry.
Second, we examine bundling and pricing behavior of …rms in response to variations in consumer heterogeneity of the price coe¢ cient of demand. An explanation advanced by the theoretical literature is that bundling is used to replicate price discrimination by exploiting consumer heterogeneity in price sensitivity. We assess the plausibility of this claim by analyzing how the simulated market equilibrium changes when the variance of the price coe¢ cient of demand increases. Our simulation results indicate that …rms respond by o¤ering more products of various types. In addition, prices decrease. We observe also some quality reshu-ing from single-play products to double-and triple-play products. This quality reshu-ing takes the form of a decrease in the quality of single-play products, e.g., fewer channels or lower bandwidth, while the quality of bundles increases.
Third, we examine bundling and pricing behavior by …rms in response to di¤erent market structures. The theoretical literature has argued that, depending on the circumstances, bundling can be used either to decrease or increase the level of competition. We assess the plausibility of this claim by analyzing how the simulated market equilibrium changes when the number of …rms in the industry increases. We examine how a …rm chooses prices and products to supply in a representative market when: (i) it is a monopolist, and (ii) it competes in duopoly with a similar …rm. Our simulation results indicate that moving from monopoly to duopoly leads to both lower prices and to the supply of additional products. In contrast to the higher consumer heterogeneity scenario, increased competition leads to higher quality for all products in the form of higher values for product attributes valued by consumers.
Our two counterfactuals indicate that …rms compete in quality, in addition to prices and product availability. Yet the theoretical literature on bundling has paid little attention to competition on product availability and non to competition in quality. Our results illustrate its importance in practice.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we revise the literature related to our article. Section 3 gives an overview of the Portuguese triple-play industry. Section 4 outlines our structural model of demand and supply. Section 5 discusses our data set and the estimation and simulation of the model. We present and demand estimation results in Section 6. Section 7 conducts the analysis. Section 8 concludes.
Literature Review
Our article relates to three large bodies of literature. The …rst consists of the literature that develops estimable equilibrium models for di¤erentiated product industries, pioneered by Bresnahan (1987) and extended by Berry (1994) , Berry et al. (1995) and Nevo (2000 Nevo ( , 2001 . 5 The second consists of the literature that models and estimates the choice over bundles, which includes Augereau et al. (2006) for internet standards, Gandal et al. (2013) and Riordan (2004) for personal computer o¢ ce software, Gentzkow (2007) for print and online newspapers, and for telecommunications services. 6 The third consists on the literature on bundling and tying, which includes both theoretical and empirical work.
The theoretical literature on bundling and tying focuses on …rms'incentives, which are typically related to preference or technology complementarities, price discrimination, and 5 More generally, our methodological approach draws on the discrete choice literature, represented by, e.g., Domencich and McFadden (1975) , McFadden (1974 McFadden ( , 1978 McFadden ( , 1981 .
6 Liu et al. (2010) using the model of Gentzkow (2007) …nd strong complementarities between subscription television and …xed broadband/cable modem and between …xed voice and …xed broadband/DSL. …rm strategic behavior. 7 Stigler (1963) showed, through an example, that mixed bundling can be pro…table for a monopolist, if consumer valuations are negatively correlated across goods. Under these circumstances, bundling can be used to reduce consumer heterogeneity and has an e¤ect similar to price discrimination, thereby facilitating the extraction of consumer surplus. Afterwards, several authors, e.g., Adams and Yellen (1976) , Chen and Riordan (2011), Fang and Norman (2006) , Geng et al. (2005) , McAfee et al. (1989) , Salinger (1995) , Schmalensee (1984) , showed with various degrees of generality that this intuition holds as long as valuations are not perfectly positively correlated. Carbajo et al. (1990) , Chen (1997) showed that pure bundling can be used as a product di¤erentiation strategy that reduces the intensity of competition. However, depending on consumer preferences, bundling may actually increase the level of competition, as shown by Anderson and Leruth (1993) for the case of logit preferences. Hurkens et al. (2013) investigate in the context of an asymmetric duopoly whether bundling increases or reduces competition. Waldman (2011, 2002) , Carlton et al. (2010) , Nalebu¤ (2004) , Peitz, M. (2008) , Whinston (1990) showed that bundling can be used to foreclose the market, or more generally to create, preserve or extend monopoly positions. Chu et al. (2011) argue that mixed bundling can be very complex even with a small number of individual products and evaluates to what extent simpler pricing schemes, such as bundle-size pricing, allow a monopolist to capture a substantial part of the pro…ts of mixed bundling.
We provide an estimable di¤erentiated product equilibrium model, where consumers choose among a set of alternatives, that may or may not consist of bundles, and where …rms'pricing and supply decisions, that may or may not include bundles, are the result of optimizing behavior. The model enables evaluating numerically the empirical relevance of the behavior predicted by the theoretical literature.
There is a an emerging empirical literature on the welfare impact of bundling in several industries, which helps to put in perspective the wide range of welfare implications of the various theoretical justi…cations for bundling. Byzalov (2010) analyzed the welfare impact of various restrictions to bundling of channels for the cable television industry, using consumer level data and taking upstream prices as exogenous. Chu et al. (2011) analyzed the pro…tability of simple pricing alternatives to mixed bundling for the theatre industry. Crawford (2008) analyzed the discriminatory incentives for bundling in the cable television industry. Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) estimated the welfare e¤ects of unbundling in the retail cable television industry, using …rm level data and endogeneizing upstream prices. Derdenger and Kumar (2012) analyzed hand-held video games. Haas-Wilson (1987) analyzed the impact of state legislation on tying for the contact lens industry. Ho et al. (2012) analyzed full-line forcing in the video rental industry. analyzed if bundles of subscription television, …xed broadband and …xed voice are a relevant product market in the sense of competition policy, using consumer level data. Shiller and Waldfogel (2011) analyzed the welfare impact of various forms of pricing for the music industry.
The growing importance of triple-play products poses several problems for competition authorities and sectoral regulators, discussed in Vareda (2011, 2013) and , which need to be evaluated empirically. However, direct usage of conventional di¤erentiated product models, e.g., Berry et al. (1995) and Nevo (2001) , to examine structural market changes, such as mergers and acquisitions, is problematic. In this article we take a step to …ll in that void by developing a estimable di¤erentiated product equilibrium model that accommodates bundling behavior.
The Portuguese Industry
In Portugal, in the early 1990s, both domestic television and telecommunications were state-owned monopolies. Later on that decade, several free-to-air television channels and cable television …rms were licensed and the telecommunications incumbent, Portugal Telecom (PT), was privatized. 8 The telecommunications industry was further liberalized in 2000.
Initially, entrants based their o¤ers of …xed voice and broadband access services in the wholesale access to PT's cooper wire network. Later, as they obtained a substantial customer base, entrants resorted to the unbundled access to PT's local loop. After 2006 there was a large increase in the number of unbundled loops. As a consequence, many innovative products, for instance bundles, were introduced in the market. In the meanwhile, some entrants invested in their own infrastructures, increasing further their autonomy. In November 2007, ZON, a cable television …rm, was spun-o¤ from PT. This was an important change in the Portuguese industry. ZON, using its cable television network, started to compete with PT, using its telephone network. 9 Recently, PT initiated the deployment of a …ber-optic network, while ZON upgraded its cable network by installing DOCSIS 3.0.
The other relevant …rms in the industry include AR Telecom, Cabovisão, Optimus and Vodafone. AR Telecom began operations in 2005, basing its products mainly on …xed wireless access technology. Cabovisão, a cable television …rm, was created in 1995. Optimus, originally a mobile telecommunications …rm, entered the …xed services business in 2000 using local loop unbundling, with access via Digital Subscriber Line (DSL). After 2008 it also started deploying its …ber-optic network. Vodafone, originally a mobile telecommunications …rm, entered the …xed services business in 2000, using local loop unbundling, with access by DSL.
In November 2011, AR Telecom exited the market and passed its customers to ZON. In January 2013, ZON proposed a merger with Optimus. The operation is under evaluation 8 Private free-to-air channels were licensed in 1992, PT was privatized in 1996, cable television licenses were issued in 1997 and in 1999 cable television …rms were authorized to o¤er telecommunications services. 9 For more details see Vareda (2011, 2013) .
by the Portuguese Competition Authority.
Our data set, described below, contains information only for 2009. In that year, the penetration rate per inhabitants of …xed telephony was 40%. After a long period of decline, the penetration rate of …xed telephony started to increase again, slightly. Also in 2009, the penetration rate per households of subscription television was 45%. Of these subscribers, 57:4% used cable and 23:2% Direct to Home (DTH) technology. 10 Finally, in 2009, the penetration rate per inhabitants of …xed broadband was 18%. Of these subscribers, 57% used DSL and 40% used cable modem. Telecommunications bundles were …rst o¤ered in Portugal in 2004 through cable television networks. Afterwards, several …rms launched similar products using …xed telephone networks, either through local loop unbundling or their own networks.
Model

General Considerations
In this Section, we propose an estimable di¤erentiated product equilibrium model in the spirit of Berry et al. (1995) and Nevo (2000 Nevo ( , 2001 , but with four di¤erences. First, there is a set of basic services and …rms sell products that may combine several of these services. In our application there are three services: (i) …xed telephony (FV), (ii) …xed broadband access to the internet (BB) and (iii) subscription television (TV). Firms may sell three types of products: single-play products, which include only one service, double-play products, which include two services, and triple-play products, which include the three services. Second, consumers choose among alternatives that may combine several products, possibly sold by di¤erent …rms. For example, a consumer may choose a double-play product TV+BB supplied by a given …rm, while also purchasing a single-play product FV supplied by another …rm. Third, we model consumer preferences through a Cross-Nested Logit (CNL) model with random e¤ects. The fact that the set of all consumer alternatives consists of the set of all available product assortments, our product demand model should allow for correlation in alternative preference shocks since many alternatives contain similar products. To this end, we consider Bresnahan et al.'s (1987) parametrization of the CNL model. In contrast to conventional models of market segmentation, such as the Nested Logit, the PDGEV allows 10 In Portugal there are no independent satellite television …rms. Two of the telecommunications or television …rms o¤er satellite television services as complements to their other services in the regions not covered by their physical networks.
for overlapping product nests. This property allows us to control for closer substitution of alternatives lying within a segment, while allowing for choices containing products with various services to be present in several segments. Fourth, aside from prices, …rms choose which products to sell in each market. This allows for strategic supply behavior in markets with bundles. For example, …rms may decide not to sell a certain product consisting only of single service to encourage consumers to choose another product, which bundles that service with other services.
We denote markets by subscript t = 1; :::; T , services by subscript i = 1; :::I, products combining services by subscript j = 1; :::; J, alternatives combining products by subscript a = 0; 1; :::; A, where a = 0 is the alternative of buying no product, and …rms by subscript f = 1; :::F .
We follow the convention of denoting by x := (x 1 ; :::; x n ), a n-dimensional vector of real numbers, x j , and letting x j := (x 1 ; :::; x j 1 ; x j+1 ; :::; x n ).
Supply
We assume that …rms simultaneously decide both: (i) which products to supply, and (ii) product prices. Denote by d jt 2 f0; 1g the decision of the …rm that owns product j to sell it in market t and by p jt 2 R + the product's price. Denote by c jt the marginal cost of product j in market t, by C f t the …xed cost of …rm f in market t, by M t the number of consumers in market t, and by s jt (p t ; d t ) the market share of product j in market t. Firm f 0 s pro…t is:
In each market t, each …rm f maximizes pro…ts by choosing: (i) which products to sell, and (ii) their prices. The the …rst-order condition for price p jt is:
Firm f will sell product j in market t, if and only if, the decision to sell it generates a pro…t higher than the decision of not to sell it, i.e., if and only if, 8j 2 F f ; f = 1; :::; F :
For all j; k = 1; :::; J, de…ne the J J ownership matrix H, whose generic element is:
In addition, denote the J J matrix containing derivatives of market shares with respect to prices by , whose generic element is jk = @s k @p jt
. Denote by the Hadamard product, i.e., the element-by-element matrix product. The system de…ned in (2) can be written in matrix form as:
We follow the literature in assuming the existence of a pure-strategy, Nash equilibrium, which in our case is both in prices and commercialization decisions. That is, a Nash Equilibrium in each market t = 1; :::; T consists of a vector of product supply decisions d t = (d 1t ; :::; d Jt ) and non-negative prices p t = (p 1t ; :::; p Jt ) that solve both (2) and (3) for all j = 1; :::; J:
Demand
The complete de…nition of system (5) requires additional structure to relate product market shares and consumer demand for product assortments. We assume that consumers choose among alternatives, i.e., assortment of products sold by …rms aimed at providing several di¤erent services. For example, an assortment of subscription TV with 30 channels and broadband internet with bandwidth of 30 Mbps provides two services: subscription TV and broadband internet. Denote by u hjt the utility derived by consumer h from product j included in alternative a, by hat a preference shock of consumer h for alternative a, by X jt a K 1 vector of observed characteristics of product j, by j is a market-wise mean consumer valuation of product characteristics unobserved to the researcher, by jt the market-speci…c deviation from j , and by ( h ; h ) a vector of consumer-speci…c taste parameters for observed attributes (p jt ; X j ).
The utility that consumer h derives from alternative a is:
In addition, u hjt is given by:
We assume that the joint distribution of ( h ; h ) is:
where v h N (0, ) and is a (K + 1) (K + 1) strictly positive, diagonal matrix.
Let at be the mean utility from choosing alternative a and hat be the portion of utility that depends on consumer-speci…c components:
In the spirit of Berry et al. (1995) and Nevo (2000 Nevo ( ,2001 , we rewrite u hat as:
As the utility derived from alternative a = 0 is not identi…ed, we let 0t = 0 and h0t = 0. That is, the utility from this outside alternative has zero mean and is given by u h0t = h0t , where h0t is the outside alternative shock.
Given the set of alternatives available in market t, each consumer chooses the alternative that maximizes his utility. We assume further that, for each consumer the vector of alternative preference shocks ( h0t ; h1t ; :::; hAt ) follows a Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) distribution. That is, as in McFadden (1978) , the joint distribution of the preference shocks vector is:
F ( h0t ; :::; hAt ) = exp G(e h0t ; :::; e hAt ) ;
where G( ) is a nonnegative, homogenous of degree one function mapping set R At+1 onto R + 0 , whose partial derivative with respect to the term e at+ hat is denoted by G a ( ). 12 Under this assumption, the probability that consumer h chooses alternative a in market t is:
s hat = e at+ hat G a (e 0t + h0t ; :::; e At + hAt ) G(e 0t + h0t ; :::; e At + hAt ) :
The fact that consumers choose among combinations of available products, possibly o¤ered by di¤erent suppliers, motivates letting our product demand model allow for correlation in alternative preference shocks. To this end, we build upon and extend the model proposed by Bresnahan et al. (1997) , where the GEV model is restricted to allow for market segmentation along Principles of Di¤erentiation (PDs), or nests. That is, we consider Bresnahan et al. 's (1997) parametrization of the CNL model. In contrast to conventional models of market segmentation, e.g., the Nested Logit, the PDGEV allows us to control for closer substitution of alternatives lying within a segment, while allowing for choices containing products with various services to be present in several segments.
We consider nests for three services: (i) FV, (ii) TV and (iii) BB. Each nest implies two segments: one with only alternatives containing a product where that service is provided, and another segment with only alternatives where that service is absent. For example, the segment F V contains alternatives that include …xed-voice telephony service, and the segment N F V contains only alternatives without …xed-voice service, except the outside alternative. The segments pairs (T V; N T V ) and (BB; N BB) are de…ned analogously for subscription television and …xed broadband, respectively. We denote the set of segments by D = fF V; N F V; T V; N T V; BB; N BBg and we restrict each pair of segments to have the same segment parameter, whose value lies between 0 and 1. That is, the segments F V and N F V have the same segment parameter F V , while T V and N T V have segment parameter T V and both BB and N BB share the segment parameter BB .
13 Under these conditions, we compose the function G( ) as:
G(e 0t + h0t ; :::; e At + hAt ) =
where d are scaling parameters de…ned by:
Denote by P ahjd the probability that consumer h chooses alternative a given that he is choosing from segment d, and by P dh the probability that consumer h chooses an alternative from segment d. Under this speci…cation, the consumer choice probability in (13) simpli…es to:
G(e 0t + h0t ; :::; e At + hAt )
Consumer heterogeneity is completely characterized by the random coe¢ cient speci…ca-tion in (8). For ease of exposition, let h = ( h ; h ), and denote F ( h ) as its CDF. Then the aggregate market share for alternative a in market t is:
In is convenient to map markets shares of alternatives de…ned in (17) onto product market shares. For each product j, its market share is the sum of the shares of all alternatives where product j is included:
The total price of alternative a, denoted p at , is the sum of the prices of the products that are part of alternative a:
For j = 1; :::; J and a = 1; :::; A, de…ne the A J matrix , which controls for the presence of products in an alternative, and whose generic element is:
13 For a discussion, see Bresnahan et al. (1997) and Wen and Koppelman (2001) .
Let p
Alt t denote the vector of total price of alternatives, as de…ned in (19). Also, Denote by S Alt t the vector of market shares of alternatives de…ned in (17). Matrix allows us to write the product market share and alternative price vectors, respectively, as:
The system of …rst-order conditions in prices de…ned in (5) involves a matrix of derivatives of product demand with respect to product prices. This matrix can also be written as a function the demand for alternatives. For any two alternatives a,b = 1; :::; A de…ne the A A matrix Alt , whose generic element is . It follows from the de…nitions above that = 0 Alt .
Econometric Implementation
The goal of model estimation is to recover the …rms'demand and costs parameters, as well as the random coe¢ cient distributions. To this end, we combine the approaches of Berry et al. (1995) and Nevo (2000 Nevo ( , 2001 by matching data information to model predictions, but with some di¤erences. First, our supply system di¤ers from the one in those articles, as it involves: (i) decisions on which product to supply in each market, and (ii) alternative rather than product market shares. Second, our demand system acknowledges that consumers purchase assortments of products. We start by describing the data used in the estimation and then turn to estimation details.
Data
Data Request
We obtained data of the last quarter of 2009 from six Portuguese electronic communication …rms, which accounted in December 2009 for 99% of triple-play customers. For con…dentiality reasons, we will refer to these …rms as f 1 ; :::; f 6 . The information obtained consisted of data about: (i) the contract, (ii) the product, (iii) the client and (iv) monthly expenditures. The characteristics of the contract are: the monthly fee, discounts or joining o¤ers, the commencement date of the contract, and the characteristics of the product. The characteristics of the product are: the brand name, the number of normal and premium television channels and the possibility of access to video-on-demand, if the product included subscription television, bandwidth, tra¢ c limits, number of e-mail accounts and the possibility of mobile broadband, if the product included …xed broadband access to the Internet, and the tari¤ plan for …xed telephony. The characteristics of the client are: age, length of the contract and residential postal code. We also obtained billing information for the last quarter of 2009, with full detail of invoices, including the …xed monthly fee and variable components, e.g., movie rentals, channel rentals, internet tra¢ c above contracted limits, expenditure on telephone calls and minutes of conversation. Finally, we obtained the total number of clients for each product o¤ered, and the geographical availability of each product. This data was complemented with information from the sectoral regulator, ICP-ANACOM, drawn from the survey "Inquérito ao consumo dos serviços de comunicações electrónicas -População residencial -Dezembro de 2009", from, hereon "Inquérito ao consumo", which characterizes the typical national consumer of electronic communication services.
Products, Markets and Choice Alternatives
We de…ne a product as a combination of …xed-voice telephony, subscription channels and broadband internet services supplied by a single …rm. A single-play product includes one service, a double-play product includes two services and a triple-play product includes the three services. Table 2 details the possible combinations of: services, forms of acquisition and …rms.
[
T able 2]
Our empirical model considers product shares and prices per market t = 1; :::; T . We de…ne a market as a statistical NUTS3 region and consider a total of 30 NUTS3 regions. 14 The information from Inquérito ao consumo allowed us to relate the electronic communication services consumed by households to the way they are acquired, and to obtain the percentage of households that do not consume any of these services. Table 3 presents the distribution of services by type of bundle in 2009.
[T able 3]
This information, and the data obtained from …rms, allowed us to determine the distributions of the services per household and the market shares per …rm for each service. We used this information along with the choice-based sample information on consumer purchases by …rm in each region to derive regional market shares.
We compute the average product price in each market as the average monthly fee, net of all discounts, that costumers from a given NUTS3 region pay for the product. Market size and shares are computed using both the information on product sales available in each region and information on number of households in each NUTS3 region, as reported by Instituto Nacional de Estatistica (INE) -the Portuguese National Statistics Institute. The 14 The Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics (NUTS) was created by the European O¢ ce for Statistics (Eurostat) as a single hierarchical classi…cation of spatial units used for statistical production across the European Union. It is comparable to Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) classi…cation in the USA. 15 We report this information in intervals for con…dentiality reasons data used in the estimation consists of a total of 1; 083 product/market observations. 16 To distinguish single-, double-and triple-play products we form dummy variables to control for bundles. The observed characteristics of a product therefore consist of: (i) F V dummy variable, (ii) BB dummy variable, (iii) number of o¤ered channels, if the product contains T V , (iv) bandwidth, in Mbps, in case the product includes BB, (v) dummy variables for double-play bundles F V + T V; F V + BB and T V + BB, and (vi) triple-play bundle dummy variable. Table 4 presents average values of prices, market shares and characteristics by type of product:
There is a total of 117 di¤erent products, yet product availability di¤ers by region. The average market share of single-play products is bigger than double-and triple-play. However, double-and triple-play products typically have higher average number of channels and bandwidth than single-play products. Moreover, the average price of these bundles is typically smaller than the sum of single-play average prices. This fact raises the possibility that bundling may be motivated by potential cost savings from selling several products jointly. We test for this possibility below.
The 117 di¤erent products sold by …rms are only a subset of the total possible products that …rms could sell. Considering the total number of possible combinations of F V , the variants of bandwidth and number of channels in BB and T V services, respectively, there are a total of 478 products that …rms could potentially sell. This restriction of product supply by …rms impacts the total number of alternatives consumers can choose from. Consumers choose among alternatives, i.e., combinations of products, possibly supplied by di¤erent …rms. The concept of alternative does not coincide with the concept of service or a product o¤ered by a …rm. A product o¤ered by a …rm may be present in several choice alternatives. For example, the single-play product of …xed telephony o¤ered by a given …rm is typically present is several alternatives where F V service is provided. There are eight possible combinations of services, six possible types of bundles, and seven possible suppliers, with one, f 0 , corresponding to the inexistence of a supplier. Taking into consideration the variants of bandwidth and number of channels in BB and T V services, respectively, as well as related products sold by …rms, there are a total of 1; 153 alternatives, including the outside option of no service, that consumers can consider out of the 117 di¤erent products sold by …rms. In practice, the actual number of alternatives available for a consumer depends on which market he is located, as product availability di¤ers considerably by region. Table 5 provides a simpli…ed illustration of some alternatives.
[T able 5] 16 We note that this is about a third of the theoretical maximum of 30 117 = 3510 observations that would be available if the 117 products were sold in all regions.
Estimation
The estimation of di¤erentiated product models is compositionally involved, due to the need to solve for unobserved product characteristics using market share equations, as in, e.g., Berry et al. (1995) , Nevo (2000 Nevo ( , 2001 . However, recent developments in the estimation of these models can be used to simplify the estimation process. We build on the estimation approaches of Su and Judd (2012) and Dube et al. (2012) , where the step of solving for the vector of jt is replaced with a constraint in the estimation problem. To this end, we reparametrize our demand model in a way similar to Nevo (2000 Nevo ( , 2001 . In what follows, we let j = 1; :::; J t denote the products that are actually observed in the data for each market t = 1; :::; T . The implied, available alternatives to consumers located in a market t are denoted a = 0; 1; :::; A t :
Let J denote the total number of di¤erent products observed by the researcher across all markets in the data.
17 Let b be a J 1 column vector such that, for each j = 1; :::; J :
Then, the mean utility speci…cation in (9) simpli…es to:
We compute the integral in (17) via simulation. That is, using a total of n S random draws from the multivariate standard Normal distribution N (0; I K+1 ) and given values for the parameter vector := ( ; ; b; ) and the unobserved demand shock t , we approximate (17) by averaging the values of (16) across draws. 18 We denote this approximation as:
where random draws are indexed by m = 1; :::; n S and s mat ( m ; ; t ) is de…ned by the right-hand side of (16).
Let S t denote the observed vector of market shares for products j = 1; :::; J t for market t, and de…ne t as the A t J t product inclusion matrix for market t as in (20) . Denoting the vector stacking the predicted alternative shares (25) over all alternatives available in market t byŜ Alt t ( ; t ), we have for all t = 1; :::; T :
17 In our sample we observed 117 products, i.e., J = 117: 18 Recall that the random coe¢ cients h = ( h ; h ) are assumed to follow a multivariate Normal distribution with matrix =diag( p ; X ): The fact that a multivariate Normal distribution can be written as a linear transform of a multivariate standard Normal distribution allows us to keep the same draws from this distribution for each evaluation of the GMM objective function described below.
The equations system de…ned in (26) is used to de…ne values for t given parameters . As t consist of product demand shocks in market t, a natural way to estimate demand parameters is to form a GMM estimator where a set of moment conditions is satis…ed as much as possible given some minimum distance criteria. Let Z jt be a vector of instrumental variables that are mean-independent of jt and where dim(Z jt ) dim( ). Then, for some weighting matrix W , the GMM estimation problem is formalized as a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC), as in Dube et al. (2012) : 
The optimization problem (27) is solved using the stochastic, global optimization algorithm of named Covariance Matrix Adaptation Evolution Strategy (CMAES). This derivativefree algorithm is based on evaluation of candidate solutions picked at random using a multivariate Normal distribution centered at an initial guess, followed by selection of the candidates that yielded the lowest values for the objection function being minimized. The selected set of candidates is used to compute the mean and variance-covariance matrix of the multivariate Normal used to draw new candidate solutions, and the process is repeated until convergence. See Hansen (2006) for a discussion. We …rst solve (27) setting the weighting matrix to identity, i.e. W = I; and we form a new matrix W using the sample analog of the asymptotically e¢ cient matrix evaluated at the solution just obtained. We resolve the problem using the new matrix W: Further updating of matrix W with new rounds of estimates did not lead to numerically signi…cant changes in estimates.
We recover the vector of average taste parameters for observed characteristics and the unobserved product quality vector =( 1 ; :::; J ) using a GLS procedure similar to the one of Nevo (2001) applied to (23). Letb j be the estimates of the coe¢ cients of the product dummy variables obtained after solving (27). The estimators for and are, respectively,
=b X^ :
where V b is the covariance matrix ofb.
Standard errors for demand model estimates must be corrected for errors due to consumer sampling process and to integration-by-simulation process. That is, we must account for the fact that we observe estimated rather than actual product market shares and that simulation draws are the same for all observations in a market. See Berry et al. (1995) for a discussion. We correct for these errors in standard deviation calculation by resorting to nonparametric bootstrap methods. That is, we resample the data points within each market with replacement and resolve (27) using this arti…cial sample. This process is repeated N times, and standard errors of model estimated are computed as the standard deviations of the N solutions to (27) obtained with the N arti…cial samples. To speed the computations of the solutions to each of the N problems, we take the original solution to (27) as the initial guess and then minimize (27) with each arti…cial sample using a Newton-Raphson algorithm. Standard error estimates ofb are also used to craft its covariance matrix V b necessary to run the GLS regression in (29). We obtain standard errors for^ by running the GLS regression in (29) for each bootstrap sample and then take the standard deviation of the N bootstrap solutions.
We are interested on testing for synergies in bundle marginal costs. To this end we use …rst-order conditions in prices to identify marginal costs. After deleting the rows and columns pertaining products that …rms do not commercialize in market t, we infer from (5) that the vector of marginal costs of products commercialized in that market, c t ; is given by:
We use the marginal cost data obtained using (31) to run OLS regressions akin to synergy testing, discussed below.
Counterfactual Simulation
The model described in Section 4 allows us to simulate pricing and bundling behavior for di¤erent scenarios.
We focus attention on only one of the 30 markets used in estimation. For our simulations, the chosen market was the Greater Lisbon area. As …rms only sell some of the potential 478 products that could be sold in each market, we need to calibrate values for their marginal costs and unobserved characteristics. We use the estimated marginal cost function with market dummy variables to assign marginal costs for products in the Greater Lisbon market. We use sample averages of j and 4 jt by product type and market to quantify unobserved characteristic on products not sold in the data. After replacing unknown parameters in demand and supply equations, we solve for the new equilibrium by minimizing the quadratic distance between right-and left-hand side of equations (5) and (3).
Formally, de…ne the multivariate function:
The equilibrium in market t can be computed by solving the minimum distance problem
Since each d t is a vector of binary variables and each p t is a vector of continuous variables, the problem de…ned in (33) is a mixed-integer program. To solve this problem we again resort to the stochastic global optimization algorithm Covariance Matrix Adaptation Evolution Strategy (CMAES) of Hansen (2006), which is capable of handling problems with both discrete and continuous controls.
Basic Estimation Results
In this Section, we present the estimation results of the demand model of Section 4.3, using the procedure described in Section 5.2 and the data described in Section 5.1. We present …rst the estimates of the demand model and afterwards the estimates of the price elasticities of demand.
Demand Estimates
Next we present the demand estimates. We discuss alternative speci…cations regarding consumer heterogeneity and the set of instrumental variables used. The variables considered for product observed characteristics, matrix X j , include service dummy variables, the logarithm of number of o¤ered channels, the logarithm of bandwidth measured in in Mbps, and both double-and triple-play bundle dummy variables. 19 We exclude the service dummy variable for T V to avoid colinearity with other dummy variables considered in the regression. The standard errors of estimates were computed using the bootstrap procedure described in the previous section for N = 500 bootstrap samples.
To estimate our model we need a vector of variables Z jt correlated with X j and independent of jt . We consider two approaches followed in the di¤erentiated product demand literature and compare the results obtained using these alternatives.
First, we consider the approach of Berry et al. (1995) , who propose using other product characteristics in X j as instruments, as well as sums of other products'characteristics sold by the same …rm and sums of rival …rms'product characteristics. 20 Bresnahan et al. (1997) extend this set of instruments further by considering characteristics sums within nests. Along 19 For continuous attributes, such as the number of channels or bandwidth, we considered function log(x + 1), where x is the quantity of interest. This ensures decreasing marginal utility in the attribute, while avoiding a log of zero when the product has neither T V nor BB. 20 Using X j in the instrumental variables set is not possible, since it is collinear with product dummy variables, sums of …rm's own and rivals' products can be considered in the instrumental variables set for solving (27).
with market-and product dummy variables, this is one of the main instrumental variables set we consider in estimation.
Second, we consider the approach of Nevo (2001) and Hausman (1996) , who propose as instruments the prices for product j at all regions other than t. These variables are valid instruments under certain assumptions. As those assumptions cannot be directly tested, we resorted to estimate the model using regional average prices. We considered a NUTS II set of markets as a region, and we formed instruments by computing the average price of a product in that region, excluding the price at the market where the product is sold.
21
Before examining the more general versions of the demand model, it is useful to examine the estimation results when certain features are excluded. Table 6 presents the demand estimation results under no consumer heterogeneity, i.e., when the standard deviations of the taste parameters are set to zero, so that all consumers have same utility function coe¢ cients.
[T able 6]
The …rst two columns display the particular case of the PDGEV model when nest parameters are set to one, i.e., the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model. 22 The …rst column presents estimates of the MNL model without instruments, while the second column presents estimates of the MNL model using the instruments proposed by Berry et al. (1995) and Bresnahan et al. (1997) . While the …rst speci…cation leads to a negative estimate of the price coe¢ cient, as expected, it is nearly half, in absolute value, of its analog of the second model. Moreover, several taste coe¢ cients have unexpected signs, e.g., log of bandwidth and log of channels. This pattern is somewhat similar to other examples where not controlling for endogeneity leads to implausible estimates, e.g., as in Berry et al. (1995) .
The third and fourth columns display the results of a similar exercise for the PDGEV model. While similar comments apply in regards to instrumenting for price, estimating nest parameters rather than setting them to one seems to be a nontrivial improvement. First, the nest parameters are in general signi…cantly di¤erent from one. Second, the estimate of the price coe¢ cient increased, in absolute value, both with and without instrumenting. This suggests that controlling for possible correlations across alternative shocks is important on identifying price sensitivity. This situation is somewhat similar to the results of Bresnahan et al. (1997) , where they …nd that the PDGEV model yields higher, in absolute value, price coe¢ cients than the two-level Nested Logit model. Tables 7 and 8 reports the estimates of the full demand model for di¤erent instrument 21 As some products are supplied only in certain regions, we considered the …t of regressing prices on X and regional dummy variables, whenever the price of a product in a region was unavailable. 22 In contrast to most of the empirical literature in di¤erentiated product demand, we cannot estimate the model through OLS or 2SLS. The reason is that product market shares do not add up to one, since households choose alternatives, instead of products.
sets and nest parameter assumptions.
[T able 7] [T able 8]
The …rst three columns contemplate the Mixed Logit (MMNL) model where nest parameters are set to one. The …rst two columns compare estimates with and without instrumenting for price. The results indicate that allowing for mixing does not mitigate the price endogeneity problem, as the coe¢ cient for price using the instruments of Berry et al. (1995) and Bresnahan et al. (1997) is nearly double, in absolute value, of the one without controlling for endogenous prices. The third column reports estimates using average regional prices as instruments as in Nevo (2001) and Hausman (1996) . While the price coe¢ cient is bigger, in absolute value, than the one of …rst column, it is smaller than the one of the second column. Moreover, some taste parameters have unintuitive signs despite being statistically insigni…cant, e.g. log of bandwidth and the FV dummy variable. This suggests that some of the assumptions validating average regional prices as instruments may not be met. The fourth, …fth and sixth columns pertain to the Mixed PDGEV model using instrument sets in the same order as the preceding three columns. The results con…rm that the instruments of Berry et al. (1995) and Bresnahan et al. (1997) yield more plausible estimates than the alternative sets of instruments. Moreover, several of the standard deviations of the taste parameter distribution are signi…cant, suggesting that consumer heterogeneity is an important feature of this market. Thus, we select the estimates of the …fth column, i.e., the estimates of the Mixed PDGEV model using the instruments of Berry et al. (1995) and Bresnahan et al. (1997) , to conduct our analysis.
Elasticities
A
Analysis
In this section we use the estimates of the model of the …fth column of Tables 7 and 8 to conduct the analysis. First we investigate if there are cost synergies. Second, we examine how the market equilibrium changes with an increase in consumer heterogeneity, measured by the standard deviation of the estimate of the price coe¢ cient of demand. Third, we examine how the market equilibrium changes as the number of …rms increases. In all
Cost Synergies
Next we test for cost synergies. Bundling may occur due to cost savings from selling several products in jointly. Indeed, several bundles sell at a discount compared to the sum of their individual prices. However, the discount may or may not be cost-motivated.
We use the demand estimates and equation (31) to recover marginal costs. Denote bŷ c jt the estimate of marginal cost of product j in market t, by A jt a vector of shifters, e.g. channels, bandwidth, market dummy variables and byY j a 7 1 vector of single-, doubleand triple-play dummy variables. 23 We run the auxiliary regression: Table 9 presents estimates of (34) for di¤erent regressor sets in vector A jt .
[T able 9]
Denote by R is a vector of restrictions. For each regression, we test for cost synergies by forming linear hypothesis on Y :
It follows from standard OLS results that R Y is asymptotically Normal and centered at zero. 25 We use this result to test every possible combination of cost synergies involving single-, double-and triple-play.
Except for the case of the regression with only product type dummy variables and for the alternative hypothesis that triple-play costs less than the sum of single-play BB and double-play FV+TV, we fail to reject the null hypothesis. This result still holds even if we consider strict equality in the null hypothesis. Thus, these results suggest that cost synergies are not a likely cause for bundling in this industry.
Consumer Heterogeneity
Next we analyze the impact of consumer heterogeneity. We assume that the current observed values are . Afterwards, we double the standard deviation of the estimate of the price coe¢ cient of demand and compute the new equilibrium and compare it with the initial equilibrium. We partition the 478 possible products into the seven possible types of single-doubleand triple-play products. The "percentage of products o¤ered" refers to the percentage of those product that is actually sold in the market, i.e., it is the frequency of the discrete control d jt within that class.
We reach three conclusions. First, in response to doubling the standard deviation of the estimate of the price coe¢ cient of demand, more products are o¤ered, except for single-play FV. The decision to sell more products is more marked for double-and triple-play products. Second, average prices decrease only slightly as additional products are o¤ered. Third, product quality, measured by the average number of channels and average bandwidth, is reshu-ed, i.e., the product quality of bundles increases while the product quality of singleplay products decreases.
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These results are consistent with the theoretical prediction that in the presence of consumer heterogeneity …rms use bundling as a price discrimination device to capture consumer surplus. In addition, our results indicate that dimensions other than price may also be important to characterize markets where …rms may engage in bundling. In our case product quality is also an important element of how …rms compete. This dimension of competition is absent from the theoretical literature on bundling, where attention focuses in pricing decisions.
Number of Rivals
Next we examine how the market equilibrium changes as the number of …rms increases. We assume that the industry consists of a monopolist similar to f 1 , a …rm that owns the same set of products as f 1 , and compute the equilibrium. Afterwards, we assume that the industry consists of a duopoly were two …rms identical to f 1 compete and compute the equilibrium.
Second, we examine how is bundling behavior sensitive to changes in market structure. In particular, we focus on simulating behavior of a monopolist …rm and compare prices, bundling behavior and product characteristics with a duopoly case, where the …rm competes against a clone of itself, i.e., with a …rm with the same set of products. For this exercise we pick one of the top …rms in this market. Table 11 presents the results.
T able 11]
The interpretation of each row is analogous as in the previous experiment, except that product sale decisions consider only products that the chosen …rm, and its clone, can potentially sell in this market. For example, the monopolist can sell at most one single-play FV, while in duopoly we can observe at most two single-play FVs, one for each …rm.
We reach four conclusions. First, a monopolist o¤ers all types of products, including bundles. Second, except for single-play FV and the double-play FV+TV, the number of products o¤ered is higher under duopoly than under monopoly. Third, average prices are lower under duopoly than under monopoly. Fourth, product quality, measured by the average number of channels and average bandwidth size, is higher under duopoly than under monopoly.
Again quality emerges as an importnt dimension in the way …rms compete in these markets.
Conclusion
When …rms o¤ering several services supply bundles of products, conventional models of supply and demand for di¤erentiated products cannot be directly used to predict market equilibria. In this article we provide a framework that deals with this problem. We model consumer demand for multiproduct alternatives that contemplate di¤erent services as a means to identify consumer interest for bundles of products. Our framework is estimable and akin to simulations of bundling behavior. We apply the MPEC estimation approach of Dube, Fox and Su (2012) to estimate our model by applying a GMM estimator to a data set from the Portuguese triple-play market. Our estimates indicate that consumer heterogeneity and correlation between preferences for alternatives are important features of demand for triple-play products. Moreover, marginal cost data implied by our model is consistent with lack of cost synergies. Instead, our simulation using the model indicates that consumer heterogeneity and strategic …rm behavior are more plausible sources of bundling behavior. Product commercialization decisions prove also to be an important control along with price on bundling behavior. This extra …rm decision is absent from most theoretical bundling models, yet our results indicate it may be important in practice. Our framework can be applied to other settings where …rms combine products to form bundles.
While our approach allows the researcher to estimate demand and supply for bundles when only product information -and not assortment choices -are available, it has some limitations. First, our extension of the PDGEV framework of Bresnahan et al. (1997) deals with the issue of correlation across alternatives due to containing similar products, yet its potential to deal with a many alternatives may be limited in some applications. For example, if there is a very large number of product variants within a certain category, or if the number of industries to consider is excessive, the number of possible alternatives may be too large to be computationally tractable. Second, the problem of solving for equilibrium where the researcher solves for both prices and decisions of commercialization may be hard to implement in practice. Recent developments in large-scale optimization and its application to industrial organization problems, e.g. Dube, Fox and Su (2012) , Su and Judd (2012) , may deal with this problem to a large extent. (1) Mixed-Logit, (2) IV Mixed Logit (BLP-BST), (3) IV Mixed Logit (Reg. Prices), (4) Mixed-PDGEV, (5) IV Mixed-PDGEV (BLP-BST), (6) IV Mixed-PDGEV (Reg. Prices). 
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